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JUST CAUSE: SOME LESSONS LEARNED

BY

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United States Army

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JUST CAUSE: SOME LESSONS LEARNED

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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United States Army

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
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ABSTRACT

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On 20 December 1989 the U.S. military initiated operations in Panama to accomplish U.S. national objectives. Operation JUST CAUSE has been described by many as a resounding success. As with any military operation, even successful ones, lessons can and should be learned. The events leading up to JUST CAUSE and those during the actual operation offer the military thinker/planner some useful tools to address some of the problems facing the future Army. This study deals with just a few of the military lessons with the purpose of inspiring critical thought and discussion.



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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Recent changes in the world will necessitate changes within the defense establishment of the United States. The fact that these changes will occur proves that the world situation will remain uncertain and the likelihood of the use of force to protect our nation's interests may increase.¹ With the debate focused on what these changes need to be, now is the time to look back in our recent history to try to find lessons which will help us to make the correct choices.

The downsizing or reshaping of the Army will place an increased demand on rapid deployment and contingency units. General Carl Vuono, before his retirement, reiterated that, "the United States must have conventional forces that can be tailored to respond to challenges across the operational spectrum ranging all the way from peacetime competition to major war".² Additionally he said that "our conventional forces must be deployable to project substantial combat power rapidly wherever our interests are threatened".³ This increased reliance on rapid mobility and

contingency operations must continue to impact on reshaping the Army.

The lessons of Operation JUST CAUSE may be vital in determining how we reshape our Army. This paper will cover three aspects of JUST CAUSE which may produce lessons at the military strategic or high operational level. The discussion of these aspects should not be misconstrued that these are the only lessons, or the most important, from JUST CAUSE.

This paper will focus on the military strategic and high operational perspective of the operation. The failures at the national/political level to resolve the confrontation between the U.S. and Panama before the intervention are not analyzed. Additionally, this paper will try to avoid the concurrent and follow-on operation of PROMOTE LIBERTY. But because the two operations are difficult to separate there will be some spill over. The intent is to deal with the military preparation/planning for JUST CAUSE and the operational level of the actual combat operations.

CHAPTER 2

PLANNING

The planning process for the commitment of U.S. forces in Panama began with the JCS Planning Order of 28 February 1988.⁴ That this planning began some 22 months before the actual commitment of troops indicates that the planning was done in some detail. The planning for the operation was both extensive and well refined. Several experts agree that JUST CAUSE proved to be one of the most complex and precise operations ever conducted by the U.S. military.⁵ Even several press reports agreed that "the speed, coordination and concentration of the air-land assault made JUST CAUSE one of the most complicated U.S. combat operations in decades".⁶

All of these nice things about the planning process aside, JUST CAUSE had its share of problems or missed opportunities. None of these lapses were significant enough to cause a failure at the operational or tactical level but they did generate problems.

This chapter will deal with several specific aspects of the

planning process and the impact these aspects had on the overall operation. The intent of this look at planning for JUST CAUSE is in no way all inclusive. The specific areas addressed here were chosen because of their uniqueness and potential interest to future planners of similar operations. No clear cut solutions will be provided, however, suggestions are made to help generate thought and critical analysis to improve performance in the future.

PRE-INVASION PLANNING

Pre-invasion planning fit into the category of contingency planning. A contingency plan is defined by Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as "a plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of a command".⁷ Throughout the months planners worked on a set of objectives based on the evolving situation in Panama and anticipated political goals. In accordance with accepted doctrine "policy decisions in large measure, are transmitted to CINCs by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which assigns missions and tasks".⁸ Although the situation in Panama was unique (U.S. plans would be required to confront an allied force in a country where a Status of Forces Agreement was in effect) the initial guidance which was provided proved to be adequate as a starting point.

Throughout the planning process additional guidance was received and briefbacks conducted. The military plan which was

finally used had been developed over 18 months with constant revisions being made before the end product was approved.⁹ This lengthy process allowed key leaders to adjust the plans as they saw fit.

The outcome from this early planning produced several strategic objectives but the overriding purpose was to remove Noriega from power. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering summed up the situation in Panama by saying "the root cause of the crisis in Panama has been the struggle between Noriega and his thugs and the people of Panama".¹⁰

Planners soon developed three basic courses of action which could be used to provide a variety of solutions. These were (1) use of overwhelming force to subdue the PDF rapidly, (2) surgical raids to seize Noriega, and (3) limited attacks against the PDF headquarters to destroy its ability to command and control. Each plan had merits and differed in scope and intensity. However, each was based on the single goal of getting Noriega out of Panama. The final decision was to execute the Blue Spoon option (a longstanding plan for a full-scale invasion).¹¹ Even though the overwhelming force course of action was selected it would need to go through several iterations, reviews and changes until the desired approach was agreed upon.

THE TWO COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF

When reviewing the planning process and the final plan it is interesting to study the guidance and intent coming from the Commanders-in-Chief. In this situation there was a change of CINCs during the summer of 1989. General Frederick Woerner initiated the planning process and thus gave the initial direction and focus for much of the groundwork. General Max Thurman arrived on the scene with his own mandate and caused a further evolution of the plan. The differences between these two CINCs caused some changes to the plans which affected operations and may have impacted on the accomplishment of some strategic and operational objectives. That these two men differed in their approach to solving the problem is an understatement.

General Woerner was replaced because his views on the use of force differed from that of the administration. Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney had begun to believe that "when anything aggressive was proposed, such as new deployments or asserting the U.S. treaty rights, [General] Woerner" would argue against it.¹² This argument is not supported by the facts. However, it does underscore the differences and loss of confidence the administration had with General Woerner.

General Woerner's plan centered around a phased deliberate buildup of forces in Panama. He believed that this slow deliberate buildup would accomplish several things. First, it would transmit

a sense of commitment on the part of the United States to the PDF and Noriega. Second, it might force a Panamanian solution by possibly giving the PDF officers the initiative to solve their problem by removing Noriega without U.S. assistance. General Woerner's plan relied heavily on his knowledge of the country, his personal experiences and his relationships with the key players in Panama. Even Secretary of Defense Cheney realized that [General] Woerner was an expert on Panama. However he also concluded that General Woerner would have to be replaced.

The disagreement between the CINC and the administration can be seen in how both his plan was reviewed and how he reacted to administration plans. Bob Woodward points out that "if push came to shove in Panama, the United States had basically two options: execute the BLUE SPOON offensive operations against the PDF, or snatch Noriega. [General] Woerner was keen on neither. Furthermore, there didn't seem to be any circumstances when he would be".¹³ However Kevin Buckley has described General Woerner's plan as "dramatically forward-looking and politically astute. His fundamental assumption was that the PDF was rotten throughout and that it had to be dismantled." The key was not the removal of Noriega from power but removing the power of the PDF from Noriega.¹⁴

General Woerner believed that "a deliberate build-up of forces...coupled with direct psychological pressure was the correct

course of action. And if this course brought about a last minute Panamanian solution" then so much the better. However, "if that failed, then the PDF would be overwhelmed by the massed U.S. forces".¹⁵ Based on this information it is clear that General Woerner had identified the PDF as Noriega's center of gravity. While General Woerner's plan was designed to rid Panama of the PDF it would also accomplish the strategic goal of getting rid of Noriega.

While the destruction of the PDF was instrumental, in General Woerner's views for getting Noriega, it did present problems unique to Panama. General Woerner recognized the significant role the PDF played in Panamanian everyday life and he directed that something must be designed to replace it upon its demise. His plan called for replacing the PDF with a uniformed force whose single purpose would be public security.¹⁶ But the time lag between the destruction of the PDF as a viable force and the establishment of a replacement had to be dealt with. This key issue was one of the reasons General Woerner's plan would concentrate U.S. effort in the population centers of Panama City and Colon. Newsweek magazine accurately reported that:

...destroying the PDF had top priority for U.S. planners: it was the one sure way to render Noriega powerless. But it also deprived the country of its strongest stabilizing force and its internal-security apparatus. About 11,500 members of the PDF [were] actually police...and other security officials.¹⁷

By focusing U.S. efforts in the cities the mere presence of U.S. troops might deter looting, crime and vigilantism. This plan's

primary focus was the destruction of the PDF but it also dealt with the threat posed by the Dignity Battalions which were centered in the cities. U.S. presence in these critical population centers would be the only defense against civil disorder. General Woerner's plan addressed this possibility.

General Woerner's position is best summed up in that he:

...addressed the obvious and troubling human, economic, and political questions raised by the prospect of large-scale action. He was blunt in saying that he opposed the use of force in Panama. He was convinced that the objective-to remove Noriega from power-was not worth the cost.¹⁸

Simplistic as this quick review of General Woerner's plan is, it does clearly show his intent and the desire to use force only as a last resort. His knowledge of the Panama situation and the key players made him believe that the objective of removing Noriega from power was not worth U.S. military involvement. His plan seemed to cover the entire spectrum of military, political, social and economic concerns in Panama. Additionally, it allowed for a gradual approach to solving the crisis. Hopefully, the final resort to military force could be avoided.

General Thurman arrived in Panama and quickly established himself. In Buckley's book General Thurman's plan is described as "a modification of a plan General Woerner had forthrightly declared he hoped would never be used."¹⁹ General Thurman "advocated military action against Noriega just as vigorously as General Woerner had opposed it".²⁰ General Thurman's attention was

directed at the destruction of the PDF by the use of military force. General Thurman must have believed that unless the PDF was destroyed quickly it could and would continue to influence U.S. actions during a slow and deliberate buildup. This prompted his desire to strike at 27 targets simultaneously at H-hour to destroy the PDF. Many of the selected targets were outside the Panama City-Colon axis. Additionally, the arrival of General Thurman and the aftermath of the October coup attempt caused "[General] Powell and [General] Thurman to rework the plan extensively" and "prodded by junior officers who were fed up with PDF harassment, [General] Thurman lobbied Washington for an all-out assault."²¹

This was a dramatic shift in focus from the concentrated effort within the major population centers of General Woerner's plan to a broader approach which focused on the PDF locations both inside the cities and outside. To accommodate all of these targets would mean that forces would be pulled away from the cities. Unfortunately, "this shift of forces left the center of Panama City largely uncovered except for the immediate area of the Comandancia".²²

The reason for this change of focus was predicated on the fear that PDF units might retain the capability to influence U.S. actions throughout a slow and deliberate buildup. Whether this is true or not might be debated forever. However, inadequate troop presence coupled with the demise of the PDF did leave the major

population centers unprotected for a short period of time. Dennis Steele of Army magazine stated that:

...the major problem in the subsequent days of the operation centered in Panama City--sporadic sniping, widespread civil looting, and 'Dignity Battalions' that roamed unoccupied portions of the city and continued to pose a threat. Forces were drawn from other task forces to counter the situation in Panama City, and U.S. troops were augmented by follow-on forces--additional military policemen and three more battalions from the 7th Infantry Division. Together, they moved to secure the city.²³

A logical connection can then be made between this lack of protection and the looting and civil disruptions which immediately followed the initial operations. It seems that this event was a major failing. Plans had been developed to address this specific problem, however, it seems that the focus of the operation changed along with the CINCs.

The differences noted above between the two CINCs' plans are not inclusive. These differences are just a few which are highlighted here to make a point. The point being that although the planning process was extensive and deliberate the changing of CINCs had an impact. If more time had been available some of the disconnects might have been resolved. But additional time was not available and the president's decision was to change CINCs. Regardless of this decision the implications of the decision were felt.

THE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Clausewitz explains the political objective as "the motive for

the war" and thus it determines "both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires".²⁴ JUST CAUSE was certainly a political event. The failure of all diplomatic efforts to resolve the crises coupled with the killing of a USMC officer and the harassment of a Navy couple on 17 December 1989 by the PDF forced the only remaining option available--the military option. Whether a military option was the original choice for the President from the start may remain a mystery but what is clear is that the political efforts, for whatever reason, were unsuccessful in removing Noriega.

President Bush, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff produced the national objectives and clearly stated them at the outset of the operation. Prior to the actual statement of these objectives the planners were operating from previously provided guidance and information which came from briefing the plans to a variety of key policy makers. Additionally, assumptions were used to develop the plans and these were not contradicted during the many briefings.

President Bush ordered that Operation JUST CAUSE be executed on 20 December 1989. The operation had four objectives: "protect U.S. citizens; support the democratic institutions in Panama; ensure the safe operation of the Panama Canal; and apprehend General Noriega and bring him to justice".²⁵

To be effective these objectives needed to be clear and they needed to be translated into military objectives which could be accomplished. Determining if these four objectives fit both of these required characteristics is probably a matter which will differ from person to person. No matter how one feels about the objectives there certainly is room for discussion. Any argument that the stated national objectives were flawed and unclear may have some merit but no matter how the discussion flows one critical fact remains--the political/national objectives (which were developed as assumptions) allowed military planners and commanders to develop military objectives which were both doable and supportive of the overall national goals.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The military objectives developed from the stated national objectives were (1) destroy the military capability of the PDF, (2) seize critical Canal facilities for protection of the Canal and (3) seize Noriega and release U.S. prisoners.

In comparing the military objectives against the national/political objectives several interesting observations surface. First, in order to safeguard U.S. citizens and to conduct the other necessary military operations within Panama the PDF had to go. Noriega's power base was the PDF. In order to prevent replacing him with someone cut from the same cloth the PDF had to go. In order to have any chance of a democratic process in Panama

the PDF had to go. What this shows is that the first U.S. military objective is built on a sound foundation. Second, in order to keep the Canal operating key facilities needed to be protected. Although this is true it also presumes that the Panamanians might desire to destroy or cripple the Canal. As unlikely as these possibilities were it was a solid military plan to protect the critical facilities and therefore not have to face the possibility of damage. Third, the seizing of Noriega was a must. The overall strategic objective was to rid Panama of Noriega. Allowing Noriega to remain in Panama would have labeled JUST CAUSE an overall failure even if all other objectives had been accomplished.

The formation of military objectives followed the intent and specific requirements of the national/political objectives. In this case it was clearly understood that the political objectives determined the military objectives and the level of effort required to achieve them. The process was not perfect but it was effective and certainly up to the requirements of the situation. The bottom line was that the national/political objectives were sufficient to provide military planners the necessary guidance to prepare the needed plans. That the plan worked is testimony to its effectiveness. No one will argue that the plans could not have been improved. But the planning process was successful and proved to be more than up to the needs of the operation.

CENTER OF GRAVITY

Army Field Manual 100-5 Operations describes the center of gravity in terms of the enemy's "source of strength or balance".²⁶ From this definition it appears that Noriega was the strategic center of gravity. If all other objectives were accomplished while losing Noriega the overall operation would have been a failure. At the operational level the PDF was the Panamanian center of gravity. The U.S. plans to concentrate military effort against the PDF and the capture of Noriega supports these centers of gravity. The majority of targets hit at H-hour were PDF bases or headquarters with actions designed to "divide and destroy Noriega's forces".²⁷ The intent was to sever the PDF's link with Noriega and thus cut him off from his power base while preventing the PDF from influencing U.S. military operations. Obviously the planners had decided that the best way to attack Noriega was by destroying the PDF.

In a review of the national/political objectives the selection of Noriega as the center of gravity at the strategic level while attacking the PDF at the operational level appears to be the correct choice. Initially the PDF was the only force with the capability to influence U.S. military operations throughout Panama. The PDF provided Noriega a firm power base within Panama while relying on support from Noriega to maintain its influence. Either without the other would find it difficult if not impossible to run the country. Together this combination could prevent any or all of

the U.S. national/political objectives from being achieved.

JUST CAUSE was clearly an operational success. But was this because the correct operational center of gravity was identified? Certainly it is true that the overall strategic objective of removing Noriega was accomplished. This was accomplished by focusing the preponderance of military effort against the PDF. But how did this insure that the other military and national/political objectives would be accomplished?

U.S. doctrine agrees that centers of gravity can change.²⁸ While this is true at the operational level it is not true at the strategic level unless the incorrect center is identified at the beginning. FM 100-5 states that "the commander seeking to strike his enemy's center of gravity must be alert to such shifts, recognize them when they occur, and adjust his own operations accordingly".²⁹ Did this occur during JUST CAUSE? Did the operational center shift from the PDF after they ceased being a factor? And if so to what? Or was the operational center too narrow all along? Why not target the Dignity Battalions? And if so how?

The PDF was identified as the center of gravity and assets were used to target them effectively. However, the Dignity Battalions which Noriega had used to benefit himself and his henchmen repeatedly were not specific targets. These irregulars

posed a unique threat and challenge. They were constructed of local populace and could form rapidly and then melt away just as rapidly. Therefore not to target them with conventional forces was probably a wise choice. But just because these units were not prepared to deal with a direct confrontation with U.S. forces did not mean that they could not influence operations. Even General Thurman agreed that "they [the Dignity Battalions] can create a substantial amount of difficulty until we go in and clean it [Panama City] up".³⁰

Once the PDF ceased being and Noriega was trapped and effectively cut off from his command and control network the U.S. focus should have shifted away from the PDF. This shift of focus should have been based on a planned event such as the destruction of the PDF. Once this occurred the plan should have shifted effort to preventing public disorder. John Dinges in his book Our Man in Panama describes the situation as follows:

Colon and Panama City imploded in a frenzy of looting, as the PDF police force dissolved with nothing to take its place to keep order. Bands of well-armed young men who called themselves the 'Dignity Battalions' roamed the streets and seemed to egg on the looters. The looting ended only when the stores were empty or came under the protection of civilian vigilantes.³¹

The threat posed by the Dignity Battalions was different than that of the PDF. The Dignity Battalions were never able to directly confront U.S. troops. The mere presence of U.S. troops or some force to replace the stability originally provided by the PDF, might have prevented these units from operating and effecting civil

disorder within the population centers.

If this analysis is correct General Woerner's plan was better prepared to support the shift in centers. His plan would have focused on the population centers, where the Dignity Battalions roamed and ultimately caused problems during the early days of the operation, along with the destruction of the PDF. If planners had correctly identified the possibility of a shift of centers, or had expanded the operational center to include the Dignity Battalions while applying U.S. efforts against both, at least the looting and civil disruptions caused by the Dignity Battalions might have been better controlled. However as the operation unfolded--" despite massive force, U.S. troops were not prepared for the violence, looting and anarchy that erupted in Panama City after the invasion".³²

An argument can be made that the CINC's intent all along was to neutralize the Dignity Battalions. However, that the looting and civil disorder did occur and was fueled by the Dignity Battalion members indicates that either the plan or the execution was faulty. An increased focus on the Dignity Battalions and the population centers may have required more time or additional troops. In retrospect additional troops could have been provided but were probably not needed. Allowing for additional time to dismantle the PDF, thus freeing up more troops to be focused against the Dignity Battalions, was possible. Once Noriega was cut

off from his command and control network and once the critical PDF units were prevented from reinforcing Noriega's headquarters their effectiveness was terminated. The destruction or neutralization of these units could then have been accomplished systematically and with little regard to time. This would have allowed for more concern to be directed towards the population centers and more specifically the need to replace the PDF as a stabilizing force.

The only criticism of this course of action is that the capability of the PDF to conduct guerrilla operations early during the operations was a perceived threat. Planners believed that the quick neutralization of these units was necessary to prevent a long drawn out guerrilla action directed against the new Panamanian government or U.S. forces. In retrospect this concern did not fulfill itself, partly because of the tactical and operational success in destroying the PDF and partly because of the ineptitude of the PDF. But the planners had no way of knowing this before the execution of the plan and therefore built the plan based on a concentrated effort against the PDF versus the population centers.

The problem of determining the correct operational center of gravity is important for future planners. JUST CAUSE remains an operational success regardless of how one feels about this point. But could the operation have been conducted better if this focus had been different?

Determining if JUST CAUSE was a strategic success may require more time. Yes, Noriega was removed from Panama. Yes, the Canal remained secure. U.S. citizens are as safe in Panama today as they have ever been. But complete strategic success will require a stable democratic government without interference from the military. The restructuring of the old PDF into a new police force is in progress but the growth of a democratic system will require time and effort over the long term.

SELECTION OF THE WARFIGHTER

One of General Thurman's first actions as the newly named CINCSOUTH was to reaffirm his warfighter. LTG Carl Stiner, the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, had been involved with the early planning efforts with General Woerner and was familiar with the evolving nature of the crisis.

In the event of military operations LTG Stiner would command Joint Task Force South. All military forces in Panama would report to him and come under his control. This included all branches of the military. "In fact, since [General] Thurman gave [LTG] Stiner operational control of the entire fighting force, that clearly delineated chain of command proceeded down to the tactical levels."³³

XVIII Airborne Corps was involved in the pre-invasion planning during the Spring of 1989. Key planners traveled to Panama

frequently to discuss the planning process and to make recommendations. LTG Stiner's influence was keenly felt as the plan unfolded and evolved.

The selection of a single warfighter in Panama was significant in establishing unity of effort within the theater of operations. General Stiner himself testified that "there were no problems with ambiguous relationships or units receiving guidance from multiple sources".³⁴ This one person provided the continuity and balanced approach to solving problems.

ADVANTAGES OF A GOOD PLAN

The advantages of a good plan may seem obvious. But they are worth repeating here. The national objectives lead to the formation of achievable military objectives. The purpose and commander's intent was clear to all planners and the successful execution of the operation is the proof. JUST CAUSE proved to be "a coordinated, highly complex series of missions executed swiftly, precisely and at night".³⁵

Having a good plan early on and allowing evolutionary changes to occur allowed for all units to conduct rehearsals and planning at lower levels. Intelligence was gathered on specific targets and reconnaissance was conducted on the actual targets in some cases. Some units, those actually in Panama, were able to review plans while looking at their assigned objectives. Additionally, knowing

what the plan entailed allowed for the pre-positioning of critical assets early on. Once in Panama they were able to rehearse their missions while remaining covert. Even with the problems noted in the plan and the process overall this operation was well planned and efficiently conducted.

CHAPTER 3

COORDINATION

The detailed planning for JUST CAUSE was designed to ensure operational and tactical success. But while the military learned the lessons of fighting as a joint force, it seems that the U.S. government did not. The planning and execution of JUST CAUSE from the pure military point of view was exceptional and was governed by the understanding that U.S. intervention in Panama had been a very real possibility for sometime and had therefore been planned well in advance.³⁶ But in review of U.S. doctrine concerning low intensity conflicts (LIC) it is evident that a significant element of power was left outside of the planning circle.

U.S. DOCTRINE

As previously stated the planning for JUST CAUSE began in 1988 and continued with increased or decreased emphasis depending on the current situation in Panama. At best the planning was an up and down process. However, the process evolved and produced an effective plan. The question which begs to be asked is, with all of this time and preparation why wasn't coordination between other

governmental agencies done?

U.S. doctrine as expressed in Army Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, clearly identifies, as an imperative, that the political efforts or goals take dominance over all others. During JUST CAUSE this can be seen by the development of the military objectives using the national/political objectives as a starting point. Without regard to the clarity or quality of either of the sets of objectives it is clear that the political objectives set the tone for the military objectives.

An additional imperative of LIC found in FM 100-20 is the imperative of Unity of Effort:

Military leaders must integrate their efforts with other governmental agencies to gain a mutual advantage in LIC. Military planners must consider how their actions contribute to initiatives which are also political, economic, and psychological in nature. Unity of effort calls for interagency integration and coordination to permit effective action within the framework of our governmental system. Commanders may answer to civilian chiefs or may themselves employ the resources of civilian agencies.³⁷

JUST CAUSE best fits into the LIC family of operations as a peacetime contingency operation. Three principles governing these types of operations are "coordination, balance, and planning for uncertainty".³⁸ Army doctrine goes on to say that military forces should cooperate with other governmental and possibly some private agencies to solve problems.

With all of this doctrine about inclusion of other governmental agencies it is unclear why "the planning [for JUST CAUSE] remained at the quiet, obscure level. [General] Woerner was forbidden to discuss his scenario with the State Department..."³⁹ These restrictions affected all segments of the plan and also affected the follow on plans to restore the government of Panama. Operational security is the most frequent argument used to support the restrictions. However, it makes synchronization of U.S. national power difficult if not impossible. This specific failure of "the planning process points out the critical need for interagency coordination on any political-military Civil Military Operation...as well as the difficulties of conducting such coordination when the plan is restricted to DOD channels only".⁴⁰

U.S. AGENCIES

U.S. Army doctrine says "that the decision to act in any of the four LIC operational categories is essentially a political one".⁴¹ This fact, along with "the inevitable ambiguity of the proper employment of force demands that weight be given to other considerations",⁴² again indicates the need to coordinate with other agencies of the U.S. government. Two departments or agencies which immediately come to mind are the State Department and US Agency for International Development. As previously stated neither of these groups were brought into the planning process.

FM 100-20 also states that "the President has assigned the

Secretary of State the authority and responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. interdepartmental activities overseas".⁴³ This statement leads to the conclusion that the State Department should have been involved with the process of destroying the Panamanian government and certainly the process of rebuilding it. After the destruction of the PDF was determined to be essential to the success of JUST CAUSE the next logical step should have been developmental assistance or rebuilding. Panama's immediate need was to replace the PDF with some organization which provided the government the necessary civil controls while preventing the politicalization of the force.

The US Agency For International Development currently provides nations assistance in both economic and social areas. Two areas to which USAID's assistance could have been put to use in Panama were the support to political, economic, and social progress and the efforts to build lasting institutions within the country.

The task of rebuilding Panama could have started with technical assistance and economic support. Technical assistance directed at building and administering new democratic programs and institutions was needed as was immediate economic support to counter the economic decline fostered by the U.S.-Panama crisis. Needless to say military planners are not well prepared to conduct these types of operations or activities and the funding to support host nation activities such as what was needed in Panama is not

included in the military budget. One example may serve to illustrate the point. At the conclusion of combat operations in Panama the concern to replace the PDF loomed and the effectiveness of whatever force built would depend on their ability to inspire confidence among the public and their ability to get around the cities and country. A decision was made that the military style uniform of the PDF would be replaced but funds were not available to purchase the required uniforms. The need for a readily recognizable uniform which did not represent the old establishment was considered important to the success of the plan. However, no money was available. Uniforms, Vietnam era jungle fatigues, were finally obtained from the U.S. military contingency stocks at Fort Bragg. Additionally, the PDF vehicle fleet had been badly damaged during combat operations. The majority of the police vehicles were out of action and massive repairs would be needed to get adequate numbers back on the road but no funds were available. General Thurman was forced to use military funds to begin repairs on the vehicles.

Although these two specific problems might seem trivial they do represent the many other problems which may have gone unnoticed or forgotten. The bottom line is that inter-agency coordination might have contributed to the reduction of these problems and military planners need to take into account the support available from other governmental sources.

THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN PANAMA

Throughout the Panama crisis the U.S. Embassy remained open for business. Although the Ambassador, after mid May 1989, was in the United States the Embassy remained operational, though drastically reduced in personnel. Throughout the crisis there was no termination of diplomatic relations with Panama. However, the U.S. did not recognize the Noriega regime and that meant the Embassy had little or no diplomatic influence in Panama. But all that aside, coordination with the Embassy, by U.S. doctrine, was required. The purpose of this coordination is best described in Joint 'Test' Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict:

(1) The U.S. diplomatic mission to the host nation includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies present in the host country. Interagency efforts are coordinated among Country Team members and are subject to policy supervision and control by the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, normally an ambassador, who is responsible to the President for the conduct of U.S. in-country policy and personnel.

(2) This coordination process uses the Country Team concept to ensure that all in-country activities best serve U.S. interests. The Country Team facilitates coordination among the departments and agencies represented in the U.S. diplomatic mission.⁴⁴

The point here is that the U.S. military operation should have been coordinated with the embassy.

CONCLUSION

This discussion is not meant to insinuate that no contact was made between DOD planners and other agencies/departments. However,

as described by a SOUTHCOM staff officer the contact which was made was limited:

...the limited discussions that were permitted resulted in important insights being incorporated into the plan while the lack of any candid discussion probably precluded the consideration of things that may have been critical to U.S. political-military success on the strategic level in Panama.⁴⁵

The operational and tactical successes of JUST CAUSE were many but the lack of interagency coordination may have prevented a total strategic victory and certainly made the long term rebuilding of Panama more difficult. Future planners must consider the degree and scope of the coordination required to meet operational security needs while ensuring strategic, operational and tactical success.

CHAPTER 4

JUST CAUSE: A LIC MODEL

Researchers tend to agree that "although many of the aspects of JUST CAUSE were unique and will probably not recur in future operations, there are several relevant military and political lessons to be gleaned from it."⁴⁶ This paper has focused on several of the military lessons rather than political issues. But the lessons of JUST CAUSE must be reviewed and interpreted with care. Understanding the nature and not just the specifics of the lessons being taught will be important. Because JUST CAUSE is a unique historical event it provides lessons that offer the Army potential solutions to future problems.⁴⁷ When looking at the lessons the viewer must fully understand the circumstances surrounding each lesson to determine if it is one worth carrying into the future or to remain permanently attached to Panama 1989.

THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF JUST CAUSE

As a model for future LIC operations Panama is certainly unique. Here is a country which has been closely associated with the United States since 1903. A U.S. presence was established and

the presence of military forces became second nature. Even the other Latin American countries viewed the JUST CAUSE as a special case because of the close U.S. involvement in Panama since 1903.⁴⁸ Logistic bases in Panama were permanent and provided much of the needed support during JUST CAUSE. For many years combat troops had been based throughout the old Canal Zone which matched up with the main population centers. Over the years U.S. forces developed an insight and familiarity with the local areas and people. U.S. Army after action reports indicated that:

..this in-depth knowledge of the roads, PDF security positions and, in many cases, the PDF responses to U.S. movement, was critical to the timing of the initial assaults during darkness on the key targets in Panama City and the Old Canal Zone.⁴⁹

Needless to say the advantage of having a force of this size inside the country in which operations are to be conducted is certainly an advantage which will not always be present.

Along with the stationing of a brigade size force and the substantial logistics facilities, the CINC's headquarters was also located within the Panama City-Colon axis as was a major port of entry, Howard Air Force Base. Both of these assets provided a unique advantage. Just by living in Panama U.S. personnel gained a familiarity with the terrain and remained close to the situation while Howard Air Force Base allowed unimpeded access to the country with a significant measure of security. The fact that planners had the opportunity to visit Panama before the operation provided a unique insight which might not be available in the future.

The ability to gather first hand tactical intelligence was a significant advantage. The PDF was under constant scrutiny from SOUTHCOM. Key personnel were observed and their movements watched. Noriega was under constant, if not total, surveillance. The 27 targets hit at H-Hour were all reconned by military units, in some cases the same units which would actually make the attack. Overflights of U.S. aircraft were commonplace throughout Panama. Unit commanders had the luxury of seeing their targets before having to fight for them. Once again after action reports indicated that:

...personal reconnaissance of the objectives was conducted by subordinate leaders. This reconnaissance assisted commanders in developing their intent, which was critical since the majority of operations were decentralized and executed at platoon and squad level.⁵⁰

The movements of U.S. personnel throughout Panama, although more difficult during the crisis, continued to be commonplace. The Panamanians had become used to contact with U.S. soldiers and citizens over the many years. Local trade and commerce continued. Some U.S. personnel continued to live on the economy without significant problems.⁵¹ This basic acceptance of U.S. personnel and U.S. involvement in Panamanian society and politics had become routine. In many cases this relationship between Panama and the U.S. had become permanent and in a way may have contributed to the inability of the Panamanians to solve their own problem. An argument could be made that many Panamanians were waiting for U.S. assistance to oust Noriega and without this help they would not act.

The point is that the Panamanians were linked to the United States. Their acceptance of U.S. involvement in their economy, society and politics had been built over the years. One critic points out that:

Panama has long been a country militarized by U.S. troops. Besides the 12,000 soldiers permanently stationed in the Canal area and in 14 military bases, there are some 7,000 dependents and relatives, 2,700 civilian employees, and 3,700 advisors.⁵²

Another critic of the U.S. operation states that "the U.S. has, in this century alone, interfered in Panamanian affairs 13 times."⁵³ The point here is that the execution of JUST CAUSE turned out to be just one more episode in a long line of U.S. involvement in Panama.

AIR SUPERIORITY

The facts of the operation indicate that:

...the U.S. invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989, was the largest American combat operation since the Vietnam War. It dwarfed the U.S. actions in Grenada in 1983 and the air attack on Libya in 1986. The only comparable antecedent was the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic, in which 22,000 U.S. troops [participated].⁵⁴

The majority of the actual combat forces used during JUST CAUSE arrived in Panama via military transports between H-hour and soon thereafter. Kevin Buckley reports that "planners called on 27 active duty and reserve Military Airlift Command units stationed at 21 bases to provide 22 C-130s, 77 C-141s, and 12 C-5As. They scheduled 19 C-130s, 63 C-141s and 2 C-5As to fly jump missions the first night while the remainder landed to unload at U.S. bases or the airfields seized."⁵⁵ The reliance on air lines of communications was total. This total reliance on air lines of

communications for delivery of combat units and their sustainment was possible because of the lack of any air or air defense threat in Panama, the relative 'lightness' of the force and the large logistical infrastructure available in the country.

The lack of any air threat allowed Army aircraft to roam freely all over Panama. This relatively benign environment allowed for the simultaneous attacks on 27 different targets. The availability of armed aircraft overhead for support was similar to past wars where U.S. troops never had to contend with enemy air attacks while always relying on continuous support from friendly assets.

The pre-positioning of troops during May 1989 by the President was designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve in Panama. The use of both air and sea transportation accomplished these augmentations which were possible due to the availability of a secure port of entry. Additionally, the permanent presence of U.S. forces and citizens, along with the unique requirements of the Canal, allowed the U.S. to deploy forces into another country without its approval. As the crisis continued, more equipment arrived. As it became clear that the use of force might be necessary additional special combat equipment (helicopters and armored vehicles) was secretly transported to Panama and pre-positioned.

Throughout the crisis planners were able to transit to Panama

without interference from the Noriega government. The use of Howard Air Force Base allowed even LTG Stiner and his staff to visit on several occasions to review and discuss plans. A portion of his staff was also pre-positioned just prior to H-hour to better control the operations from inside the country.

These are just a few of the unique circumstances surrounding JUST CAUSE. These circumstances certainly offered the U.S. military a significant advantage. This advantage, when coupled with the relative weakness of the PDF (the overall combat strength of the PDF was approximately 3,500),⁵⁶ allowed U.S. forces to plan and prepare for a quick strike to neutralize the Panamanian forces, thus allowing for minimal casualties and damage on both sides. These specific advantages will not always be present and many of the lessons of JUST CAUSE are built around these unique circumstances.

FUTURE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND THE LESSONS OF JUST CAUSE

The lessons discussed here fit into three broad categories: training, deployment, and joint operations. Some may argue that none of these areas fit into the strategic or high operational arena and that may be true in principle. However, their impact on the strategic or operational levels of war remains real.

With the U.S. Army being reshaped into a leaner fighting force the need to be able to deploy quickly and with more efficiency and

lethality increases. President Bush, in his report on National Security Strategy, stated that:

We must be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where prepositioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be available and where there is a less developed industrial base and infrastructure to support our forces once they have arrived. Our strategy demands we be able to move men and material to the scene of a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to field an overwhelming force.⁵⁷

During JUST CAUSE a division equivalent was deployed and employed in close to 36 hours. Upon arrival all units were required to be ready to fight immediately. This requirement will only get more stringent and demanding as the Army continues to grow smaller and shrinks into a CONUS base. The deployment occurred from several Army installations and required aircraft from four different Air Force bases throughout the United States. This ability to rapidly group assets, specifically the strategic airlift, at several Army departure airfields requires a system capable of working under decentralized control. This will mean a commitment to continued excellence in the area of training both within the Army and at the joint level. Experts agree that:

...while the U.S. establishes and trains individual units as Army, Air Force, and Marines, they fought in Panama and probably will fight in the future in a joint task force drawing on the capabilities of each service to accomplish the operational objectives.⁵⁸

This point is now taking on new importance since the successes enjoyed after both JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. General Woerner and Gabriel Marcella argue that "the United States has awesome instruments of national power--military, economic, informational,

etc. Bringing these to bear in a cohesive way in a given crisis is the compelling challenge for statesmen".⁵⁹ To the military this means fighting as a joint team. But it must be expanded beyond the DOD. The U.S. government must be just as concerned as the military with integrating all assets available. Interagency and intergovernmental jointness must be achieved. All assets must be focused towards accomplishing a clearly stated common goal. Future planners must find a way to integrate all aspects of U.S. national power because as the government 'reshapes the military' no single element may have the capability to be successful by itself.

JUST CAUSE was a come as you are operation. Deployment orders were also, in most cases, employment orders. As the Army becomes more CONUS based readiness will take on an increased importance. Units which never had a rapid deployment mission may need to reevaluate their training programs. Tasks such as outloading by air, rail and sea will increase in importance. Units with a specific regional focus may become less useful. While the utility of units with a more general capability will increase.

The threat of deployment to future trouble spots may increase. General George Crist, a former Central Command CINCPAC, believes that with a declining or nonexistent:

...likelihood of a direct U.S.-Soviet conflict, operations in the Third World will move up in priority. Local and regional instabilities in the Third World will take on a greater prominence in U.S. security interests and concerns.⁶⁰

Regional plans may continue to be important, however, this importance may recede as a higher importance is placed on deployment plans. How all of these things will play out in the future is uncertain but if the U.S. is to continue to exercise its responsibilities as the only remaining super power a clear vision is needed.

The importance of a good plan well rehearsed was once again proven effective. This is an old lesson which has constantly been proven again and again at the CMTCs. But to be effective rehearsals must include the entire force. That means joint rehearsals. The ability to fight as a joint force will only produce success if practiced. Joint communications is certainly an example. The building of a plan to allow units from all services and several geographically separated Army units to properly communicate had a significant effect on the success of operations in Panama. Army after action reports point out that "the integration of light and heavy forces was common throughout JUST CAUSE along with SOF/conventional coordination and operations".⁶¹ Critics have stated that:

...the operation [was] a textbook example of rapid deployment and ...proved the worth of combined doctrines that govern employing special operations, airborne and light infantry forces in their respective roles.⁶²

One reason for this success was the naming of a single commander, LTG Stiner, who had experience involving all of the different types of units committed. That this experience was instrumental and mandatory for success is difficult to challenge. However, what is

clear is that the credibility which LTG Stiner and his staff brought with them was a factor for success.

The total reliance on use of strategic airlift to first get the forces to Panama and then to sustain them throughout the operations is a forbearer of the future. As the military 'reshape' themselves the importance of power projection will increase. General Crist explains that "this means placing primary reliance on projecting military power from the United States, rather than depending upon some 375 overseas bases and nearly a half-million forward-deployed U.S. forces".⁶³ The aging of the airlift (C-130s, C-141s and C-5As) fleet will make the rapid movement of the force much more difficult. The advent of the C-17 will be a positive improvement but the limited numbers of new aircraft will not completely solve the problems. Army force planners must continue to attack force structure and purchasing of new equipment along the lines of getting better, lighter and more versatile equipment for less money. The force structure must be carefully addressed to tackle problems of rapid deployment and deploying with the right units and equipment. General Crist makes the point that to retain a credible deterrent "requires reshaping the bulk of the present active conventional structure into a lean, flexible, combat-ready general reserve in the United States. It calls for forces capable of quickly moving anywhere in the world where a regional crisis or impending conflict threatens an ally or American vital interests".⁶⁴

Many of these issues are not new and certainly many will not be answered with easy snappy answers. But by raising them and discussing possible solutions they may help to shape the Army of the future and thus they will have an impact on the strategic leadership of the Army.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The impact of JUST CAUSE on the military and nation probably has not yet been fully realized. Because DESERT SHIELD/STORM occurred just a year after JUST CAUSE much of the focus of the military thinkers has been shifted to the larger operation. However, the lessons of JUST CAUSE should not be forgotten or placed on hold for there is much to be learned. JUST CAUSE is a good example of a contingency operation in a low intensity conflict.

STRATEGIC LEVEL

The national/political guidance provided for JUST CAUSE can be discussed either from the point of view that at least some was given and that which was given was adequate to meet the needs. Or it can be discussed from the point of view that the guidance given was faulty, unclear and vague. Either point of view will result in a variety of lessons all of which may be beneficial. That this specific debate needs to take place is certain and the results will only improve the process of developing future strategic objectives.

Review of JUST CAUSE requires the understanding of all the diplomatic actions which went on throughout the Noriega and pre-Noriega years. From a LIC perspective the United States was actively engaged in an ongoing conflict with Panama for sometime before 20 December 1989. Specifically, a critic of U.S. involvement believes that "Panama was the new laboratory where so-called low-intensity warfare had been in full application for 27 months when the invasion came".⁶⁵ That Panama was the 'new laboratory' for 'so-called low-intensity warfare' is probably an overstatement but the conflict in Panama was being waged through political and military means by the diplomats and soldiers on both sides for some time before JUST CAUSE. Many U.S. agencies and departments were involved with no single one in charge.

The diplomatic failures of the United States lead to military action. A critic argues that "to a great extent, the intervention in Panama was an acknowledgment of U.S. inability to manage this crisis politically".⁶⁶ As the political/diplomatic operations continued to fail the military option increased in probability. However, military success may not always produce long term success in the political/diplomatic area.

The role of other governmental agencies and departments in the prosecution of LIC is something which needs more discussion at all levels. DOD's role and how the coordination should be conducted while observing operational security is something which must be

addressed. As the military continues its movement towards joint operations so must the government. This jointness has the potential to produce lasting solutions meant for the long term rather than producing short term solutions which usually contribute second and third order effects which are as serious as the original problem.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

From the operational level JUST CAUSE was a great success. Operational command and control was effective and unified under a single commander. One military officer offers a concise definition and rationale for a nice, straight chain of command:

One responsible and accountable commander and a clearly defined chain of command are infinitely superior to the collage approach to interventions, where too much is left to vagaries of cooperation and coordination. Joint task forces and coalition warfare are the wave of the future, but these make the need for a single authoritative commander only more pronounced.⁶⁷

The use of overwhelming force produced the desired results of eliminating the PDF while keeping friendly casualties to a minimum. An interesting argument for the use of overwhelming force can be summed up as, "our [U.S.] sense of fair play may tend to make a graduated response appear more humane and civilized, the probability of success is compounded if the enemy"⁶⁸center of gravity is not attacked effectively. The trade off is that collateral damage may increase along with the proportional increase in force. However, the damage done to Panama was relatively minor. That less could have been done is certainly worthy of discussion

but efforts were taken to keep destruction under control and in most cases it was successful.

The constantly changing rules of engagement presented commanders with a new perspective on combat operations. Not only were the rules being changed daily to meet the changing needs of the conflict but JUST CAUSE slipped from the political end of LIC into military action and then it slipped back again. Although this paper did not go into the follow-on operations in Panama this is an area worthy of review. Here is an example of operations within LIC which transition across the entire continuum and then goes back again. This single aspect of JUST CAUSE is worthy of thought and much discussion and may have far reaching implications on how the U.S. involves itself with other countries in the future.

JUST CAUSE clearly demonstrated that the military had worked hard to improve itself since Grenada, Desert One and other operations which did not go as well as desired. Lessons were clearly learned and faults corrected. Many of the problems noted during Grenada were fixed and similar operations in Panama were conducted with great precision. JUST CAUSE was carried off swiftly and decisively. Additionally, even frequent military critics, when discussing JUST CAUSE, agree that "there were none of the lethal embarrassments that characterized the Grenada invasion or the Iran rescue mission".⁶⁹

TACTICAL LEVEL

At the tactical level it may not be useful to come away with any lessons based on a comparison of the U.S. military against the PDF. But what may be useful is to look at what allowed the U.S. military to accomplish its tactical objectives so well. The successes at the tactical level confirm that the training focus of the U.S. military is on the right track. In only a few short days, Operation JUST CAUSE, proved that the U.S. had overcome many of the problems which had plagued both force development and training.⁷⁰

The ability to conduct quick, surgical strikes versus a sledgehammer approach has been gained only through hard work and long hours of training. The compliance with rapidly changing rules of engagement was testimony to the discipline and effectiveness of U.S. troops. LTG Stiner may have summed it up best by saying:

Every person of our 26,000 member joint task force understood the complexity of this mission, and the need to minimize casualties and destruction. Everyone knew that there would be personal danger, but not a single one hesitated to go--or to enter battle--time and time again.

You would have been proud of your soldiers. No one has ever fought more bravely for their country or with greater compassion for those that they faced in battle. No one has been more disciplined under fire--or more mature in carrying out their duties.⁷¹

FUTURE

The world is an ever changing place. The changes seen in just the past several years offer much hope. However, the requirement to protect national interests will remain.

The U.S. military will certainly change along with the changes occurring in the world. JUST CAUSE may have a significant impact on how the military should look at the end of these changes if lessons are actually learned. The lessons of this particular operation should be required study for both military personnel and politicians. As a contingency operation within LIC it covers a wide variety of potential problems and can provide valuable lessons to both political and military leaders.

With the demise of the Soviet Union the U.S. has seen many changes occur. These changes offer many opportunities for improved dealings with other countries. However, conditions for dissatisfaction will continue to plague many countries. This dissatisfaction has the potential to grow into situations which may threaten U.S. interests and thus require some form of response from the United States. Operations in a LIC environment are a likely outgrowth of this response and JUST CAUSE represents not only our most recent involvement in such a case but one which can offer many lessons for future operations.

ENDNOTES

1. Richard Szafranski, "Thinking About Small Wars", Parameters, September 90, page 39.
2. Carl E. Vuono, "The Strategic Value of Conventional Forces", Parameters, September 90, page 7.
3. Ibid, page 9.
4. John Fishel, "The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama", Draft paper dated 10 September 91, page 15.
5. "Pentagon took note in Grenada to avoid error in Panama Operation", Washington Times, 22 Dec 89.
6. Ibid.
7. Joint Publication 1-02.
8. JCS Publication 3-III-2.
9. John M. Broder and Melissa Healy, "Panama Operation Hurt by Critical Intelligence Gaps", Los Angeles Times, 24 December 89, page 1.
10. Thomas R. Pickering, "Panama: A Just Cause", statement to United Nations Security Council, 20 December 89.
11. Russell Watson, "Target Noriega", Newsweek, 1 January 90, page 20.

12. Bob Woodward, The Commanders, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, page 93. This statement shows that a rift was developing or had developed between the CINC (Gen Woerner) and the administration. In fact Gen Woerner did not disagree with implementing aggressive actions against Noriega. The implementation of exercises or operations to reinforce the U.S. rights of movement IAW the Canal Treaty were started while Gen Woerner was in command. Gen Woerner's earlier requests for authority to conduct aggressive actions were denied.

13. Ibid, page 93. The issue was not that Gen Woerner was fond of a specific course of action. His plan covered the entire spectrum of possibilities, from a Panamanian sponsored solution to the use of U.S. force. The development of BLUE SPOON while Gen Woerner was in command indicates that he did see circumstances where the use of force might be necessary. Again, the point to be understood here is that the CINC and the administration, for what ever reason, did not agree.

14. Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, page 188.

15. Fishel, page 54.

16. Buckley, page 188.

17. Tom Morganthau with Douglas Waller, "For Bush, the Best of a Bad Bargain", Newsweek, 1 January 90, page 25.

18. Buckley, page 189.

19. Buckley, page 222.

20. Ibid, page 222.

21. Watson, page 20-21. Many knowledgeable people would argue that Gen Thurman was beyond "prodding" by junior officers. The point here is that the October coup caused a weakening of the PDF and this loss of power coupled with Gen Thurman's aggressive attitude helped to determine the final decision.

22. Fishel, page 56.

23. Dennis Steele, "Operation Just Cause", Army, February 90, page 44.

24. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, 1976, page 81.

25. Dennis Steele, "Operation Just Cause", Army, Feb 90, page 35. The wording of these objectives differ slightly from the actual words spoken by President Bush. No attempt is made here to second guess the exact wording or to question the effectiveness of these objectives. They are simply listed here to demonstrate that the military objectives did support the national/political objectives.
26. FM 100-5, page 10.
27. Broder and Healy, page 27.
28. FM 100-5, page 180.
29. Ibid, page 180.
30. Morgenthau with Waller, page 24.
31. John Dinges, Our Man in Panama, New York: Random House, 1990, page 308.
32. Broder and Healy, page 27.
33. William C. Bennett, "Just Cause and the Principles of War", Military Review, March 1991, page 9.
34. Ibid, page 9.
35. Steel, page 36.
36. Watson and Tsouras, page 68.
37. FM 100-20, page 1-5.
38. Ibid, page 5-1.
39. Buckley, page 189.
40. Fishel, page 48-49. U.S. doctrine does not limit this need for coordination to Civil Military Operations. Although the initial phases of JUST CAUSE had limited CMO activity it was there. As the operation continued the percentage of combat to CMO activity sharply decreased in the favor of CMO.
41. FM 100-20, page 1-8.
42. Ibid, page 1-9.
43. Ibid, page A-0.
44. JCS Publication 3-07, page I-15.
45. Fishel, page 49.

46. Watson and Tsouras, page 189.
47. Ibid, page 97.
48. United States General Accounting Office Factsheet for Representative Rangel, page 5.
49. Bulletin No 90-9, "Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned", Vol II Operations, CALL, Ft Leavenworth, Ks, October 90, page II-4.
50. Ibid, page II-5.
51. Most Department of Defense personnel who were living "on the economy" were moved between 11 May and 1 July. This included all uniformed and Embassy personnel. The only people remaining were some diplomats, Panama Canal Commission personnel, and several DOD personnel without transportation agreements.
52. Carlos Fazio, "The Invasion Before the Invasion", World Press Review, February 1990, page 20.
53. Jochen Siemens, "Bush's Big Stick", World Press Review, Feb 1990, page 16.
54. Dinges, page 308.
55. Buckley, page 76.
56. The PDF was approximately 18,000 strong. The ground combat units made up about 3,500 with the remainder spread out among the Air Force, Navy and other social/political organizations.
57. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, page 29.
58. Watson and Tsouras, page 96-97.
59. Gabriel Marcella and Fred F. Woerner, "The Road to War: The U.S.-Panamanian Crisis, 1987-89", unpublished paper, 6 May 1991, page 56.
60. George B. Crist, "A U.S. Military Strategy for a Changing World", Strategic Review, Winter 1990, page 18-19.
61. Bulletin No 90-9, page II-2 - II-3.
62. Steele, page 36.
63. Crist, page 17.
64. Ibid, page 17.

65. Fazio, page 20.
66. Antonio Cano, "A Chain of Errors", World Press Review, Feb 1990, page 16.
67. Szafranski, page 47.
68. Ibid, page 47.
69. "After Panama", The New Republic, 22 Jan 1990, page 10.
70. Steele, page 36.
71. Speech by LTG Stiner on 12 January 1990 after the redeployment of the corps to Fort Bragg.

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